macroafricaintel | Much ado about a red carpet

By Rafiq Raji, PhD
Twitter: @DrRafiqRaji

What was Muhammadu Buhari, the Nigerian president, supposed to do when he disembarked from his helicopter in Dapchi, the town of the most recent kidnapping of schoolgirls in northeastern Nigeria? Pray tell, should he have deliberately walked on the green grass or sandy grounds just so he would not be accused of needless pageantry on the occasion and venue of such a sad event? We need to be reasonable. The outcry about the great matter might be beneficial in the long run, though. Now the protocol office would know to ponder whether the optics of an arrangement would serve the best interests of their principal or indeed their functions; after all protocol officers are expected to be intelligent folks. A president should not be expected to have time for such little things. At least, not if he or she is doing the job we elected him or her to do. The other criticism about how President Buhari said his handling of this most recent kidnapping is better than his predecessor’s handling of that of the Chibok girls, is, however, justified. The comparison was tacky and unnecessary. It was a mistake. And yes, those who say what is needed from the president at this time is action and not sympathy certainly have a point. I shall choose not to belabour the point of Mr Buhari’s unusual timing and choice of venue for throwing a jibe at his predecessor. That said, I certainly do not buy the story by the presidency that Mr Buhari needed to properly digest the security reports about the incidents before heading to Dapchi and elsewhere. Let me be clear. The president cannot visit every place there is a terrorist incident or kidnapping. But the abduction of schoolgirls, especially in northern Nigeria, is so sensitive that there should not have been the slightest hesitation about getting “the eagle” in the air momentarily after the news. That is the past now.

Smell a rat
During the now ill-fated trip of outgoing American secretary of state Rex Tillerson to Abuja last week – the reason I suspect Mr Buhari kept checking his watch whilst at Dapchi, who he was scheduled to meet a few hours later – the president revealed negotiations were ongoing to rescue the Dapchi girls. When asked whether the Americans were helping, Mr Tillerson gave a scripted generalist answer. My interpretation is that the Nigerian security forces are handling the matter with little or no help from the Americans. By the way, there is usually at least one surveillance satellite ahead of key hotspot countries at any time; any of which could belong to one of the major superpowers, who as could be discerned by the supposed coincidental visits of the Russian and American foreign ministers to Africa recently and the American concerns about the rivalling Chinese influence on the continent, keep a very close eye on activities on the ground here regularly. The problem is that even if the Americans and others were able to follow the trail of the kidnappers, without Nigerian forces on the ground at the time of the event, there was likely little else that could have been done. Which is why the withdrawal of troops from Dapchi just before the sad incident is suspect. It is, however, hugely unlikely, that the truth would ever be revealed. But of course now, the military would get all the funds it needs and terrorists would get to beef up their coffers with public revenue from likely ransom payments to rescue the girls.

Extraordinary measures needed
When you ponder these events, you almost get miffed that Nigerian authorities seem hesitant to declare marauding herdsmen terrorists, who despite recent presidential visits to the sites of their mayhem, continue to maim and kill with seeming impunity. What is the difficulty? In fact, it is believed the hate speech legislation being considered by the Nigerian parliament is in part motivated by elite concerns about the demonisation of Fulanis around the killings by herdsmen. True, the legislation is not particularly novel in these parts. South Africa, another African country, is considering one. But to ascribe the punishment of death to speech is heavy-handed. Never mind that there are already ample existing laws on libel and incitement. And even as it is likely that criminals have been taking advantage of killings by supposedly Fulani herdsmen to cloak their own heinous acts, there is yet to be any culprit captured by the police or security services in regard of these killings that is not Fulani. Besides, there is evidence, from the letter written to the Benue State governor, to media utterances by principals of the association of cattle owners and herders, to suggest that these dastardly acts are organised and the culprits easily identifiable if there is the will to apprehend them. The reason it is important to declare the herdsmen perpetrating these heinous crimes as terrorists, that is, apart from the fact that what they are doing is in fact terrorism, is that it enables the authorities to take extraordinary measures in law that quicken apprehension and prosecution. The president’s gentlemanly approach is not working.

macroafricaintel | MTN listing must be truly local

By Rafiq Raji, PhD
Twitter: @DrRafiqRaji

I participated in an interesting debate on Twitter this weekend past. In a sharp departure from my usual approach to using the micro blogging site, I reacted almost instinctively to a post by a well-respected business journalist about the upcoming MTN listing on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). He had it on good authority that all four financial advisers chosen by the South African telecoms firm for the transaction are South African companies. (Pardon the tautology; but you likely see the point.) My view was that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) can and should intervene. Otherwise, what is the whole point of the exercise? (MTN was “advised” to list on the local exchange.) The opposing views, well-informed ones, I might add, were that such an intervention would be an anomaly. Even if the advisers are foreign-owned, are they not properly licensed to operate in Nigeria, one of the grandees in Nigerian (and indeed African) finance wondered. I took the point. But did MTN even ask for issuing house proposals from indigenous houses? Since the journalist relied on sources, I will leave that question in the air. But he did add that MTN “asked local houses to send proposals to bid for…stock brokerage only…” (Note my use of “indigenous” and not “local”. By the former, I mean an issuing house or advisory firm set up and operated by Nigerians. The journalist’s use of “local” means “indigenous”, though. So from here on, if you happen on “the grandee”, “the journalist”, “local” and “indigenous”, you know what I mean.)

Free market intervention
After mulling the issue a little bit, I came to the firm view that SEC should insist on a sizeable local content for the MTN issuance. And “local” must be truly local. Naturally, such an interventionist approach would not sit well with most market participants. Another well-informed participant in the debate reacted with wry humour if not sarcasm (not in a bad way): “I thought we operated…a free market? Perhaps government should also legislate how the book-running and roadshow [should be] conducted and proportional share allocations as well.” Yes, the globalist grandee agreed. But then I added that even as America and Europe are supposedly free markets, when a mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transaction borders on national security or involves strategic sectors or differential technologies, they do intervene or block it outrightly. I cited the recent example of American regulators blocking the US$580 million acquisition bid for a semiconductor company by a Chinese fund. Another example is the blocking of the US$1.2 billion sale of MoneyGram to Jack Ma of Alibaba by US regulators. France also recently blocked the takeover of the Toulouse airport by a Chinese firm.

Practice and law
A rebuttal to my point was that blocking a deal and choosing advisers are two different things. True. But I was not suggesting that the SEC choose the advisers but that the unique nature of the MTN transaction requires that indigenous firms be part of the “cream” (advisory and underwriting) and not just the “crumbs” (brokerage, placement agency, etc.) of the process. Relegating indigenous firms to just brokerage and placement agency was almost disdainful, I thought. (Of course, this is speaking hypothetically; since MTN has not revealed the full details of those it has mandated for the transaction.) Besides, shouldn’t a local content policy apply to all industries? Investment banking is an industry too. And even as the SEC may not necessarily have legal standing (as yet, at least) to compel MTN to include indigenous advisers in its proposed NSE listing, couldn’t it “advise” the firm to include them? My drift here, as I stated then, is that if indigenous advisory firms are not given due consideration on these mega deals, only the foreign-backed local firms would secure them. After all, they have better expertise, wider networks and deeper pockets. Even so, the rhetoric relevance of my examples could be stronger. (The grandee is a skilled debater.) So, I conceded the point. Not for long.

Local content is global
In China, a global law firm would not be able to do legal “work without partnering with a Chinese firm”, goes one article by the Financial Times in February (“Chinese M&A boom provides slim pickings for global law firms”); this was the closest example I could quickly find on how a local content policy could also be germane for the advisory business. What did the Chinese do? I will quote the FT article freely: “Non-Chinese lawyers are not allowed to practice mainland law, although they can provide informal advice. [And] recruiting Chinese lawyers into global firms does not solve the problem as they have to give up their local licenses.” Of course, financial advisory comes with some peculiarities; some mandates involve not just advice but underwriting as well, for instance. Even so, a local content policy is by its very nature interventionist. It is designed to ensure that compliance is not a choice but a necessity. In Nigeria, “local content” tends to be associated with the oil and gas industry. (I will leave the story about how foreign players in that industry circumvent local content requirments for another day; but maybe you should ask your friends there how much they really learn on those long stays at head office abroad.) I assert “local content” is relevant for the financial advisory business in Nigeria (and elsewhere) as well. We are all too quick to note China’s success. But surely, they did not achieve it by taking things easy. They persuaded, cajoled, and spied to get ahead. And when they had it in their power to force their will, they did not hesitate to wield it. Nigerian authorities asked MTN to list on the local exchange. They must also ensure that the process is truly local. (By the way, the debate is still on.)

Also published in my BusinessDay Nigeria newspaper column (Tuesdays). See link viz.

macroafricaintel | Tillerson in Africa

By Rafiq Raji, PhD
Twitter: @DrRafiqRaji

Hours before American secretary of state Rex Tillerson was scheduled to land in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital, President Uhuru Kenyatta and his main political rival, Raila Odinga, held a press conference in which they vowed to mend fences and work together. This was the first time they would meet since a bitter election dispute that started almost 7 months ago. Hitherto, Mr Tillerson’s 5-nation Africa trip, which started this week, was written off as one focused on security and not necessarily concerned with other cogent issues germane to helping Africa move ahead. The five countries Mr Tillerson is visiting, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Chad and Nigeria, have been grappling with one security issue or the other. Even so, African countries would also be interested in knowing whether they need worry about a negative surprise from the Donald Trump administration in regard of American trade policy; in light of its recent import tariffs on aluminium and steel. How much of a factor Mr Tillerson’s imminent arrival in Kenya was in getting President Kenyatta and Mr Odinga together remains to be seen. But after their public reconciliation today, all the negative headlines about Kenya, most of which were related to their caustic political standoff, have become largely irrelevant. They said the right words. And their body language suggested they were being sincere. Needless to say, it is a very positive development. Of course, there remains the issue of the worrying indebtedness of the Kenyan fiscal authorities and so on.

Look beyond security
Mr Tillerson’s visit is also opportune for Ethiopia, currently in transition and under a suspect state of emergency, as prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn takes a bow. The American foreign minister did not pull his punches upon arrival there, asserting that what Ethiopia needed at this time was a freer society. How much of an impact his words would have also remains to be seen. But judging from recent political developments, the ruling Tigray elite have little choice but to allow for a more representative government. And considering Ethiopia is still largely aid-dependent, Mr Tillerson’s remarks could be differential. The American foreign minister is also expected in Abuja in a few days. It would be the most high profile visit by an American official to Nigeria in recent times. Nigerians, who were more than a tad disappointed that former American president Barack Obama did not deem it fit to stop by, would nonetheless be looking forward to Mr Tillerson’s visit. Incidentally, he would be arriving at a time when the recent abduction of more than hundred school girls in Dapchi, northeastern Nigeria, is still fresh in their memories. I suppose they would want to ask him if America made an offer of assistance to the Muhammadu Buhari adminstration like it did the Goodluck Jonathan government for the Chibok girls. Other African countries would love to get a sense of American policy on their issues as well. South Africans have been a little taken aback for not being on Mr Tillerson’s itinerary, for instance. The American view of the new Cyril Ramaphosa administration’s land expropriation without compensation policy is one some nervous market participants would be interested in. When asked about the matter at a conference call ahead of Mr Tillerson’s trip, acting assistant secretary of state for African affairs Donald Yamamoto did not give a definite view.

Competing for influence
In light of the foregoing, there is a risk of overestimating the influence of the Americans in Africa. They are not as important as they once were. Mr Tillerson has certainly shown a realism in this regard. In fact, the focus of his first speech in Addis Ababa was preponderantly focused on China’s now enviable hold on the continent. He mentions the growing indebtedness of African countries to China, in particular; cautioning them not to sell their sovereignty away. Coming from the Americans, who through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), were once similarly overbearing on African politics and policy, and perhaps still are, it seemed a little uncanny. But it speaks to the concern of the Americans about the Chinese. Already, the Americans plan to clarify from China in a meeting scheduled for the spring what their operational military goals in Africa are. That meeting, if it holds, would likely be dominated by Chinese military activities in Djibouti. In February, Djibouti terminated its contract with Dubai’s DP World for the management of Doraleh Container Terminal at the Djibouti port. American intelligence has it on good standing that the Chinese, who already have a military base in the country, would likely be gifted the port; with potentially “significant” consequences for American military operations in the country. Incidentally, Mr Tillerson’s Africa trip coincided with a similar one by Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov. While in Ethiopia, Mr Lavrov and Mr Tillerson stayed in the same hotel but did not meet. Before arriving in Addis Ababa, Mr Lavrov was in Harare to meet President Emmerson Mnangagwa to agree military and mineral deals. The Americans have more than the Chinese to worry about, it seems.

macroafricaintel | Post-crisis transitions: Liberia and Sierra Leone

By Rafiq Raji, PhD
Twitter: @DrRafiqRaji

A number of African countries remain insecure. And no African country could be said to be totally secure. It is a matter of degree. A sudden change in circumstance has been known to spur protests that sometime get out of hand. These crises are sometimes occasioned by opportunists long searching for just the right moment to open old wounds, settle a score or achieve a political objective; with terrorism increasingly becoming the means of choice. (The current precarious security situation in Nigeria is a pertinent example.) Some crises or protests have been spurred by simpler things, however; like higher cost of living, in Tunisia and Sudan, for instance. A few years ago, it was the same reason that led to protests in Egypt and indeed Tunisia; which eventually toppled incumbent governments and replaced them with new ones. There was not so much of a revolution in Egypt, though. After electing an Islamist-oriented leadership, the Egyptian military stepped in. Now, the army chief who led the charge is president and up for “re-election”. Better progress was recorded in Tunisia. But judging from recent agitations, a more representative government has not been enough to assuage the angst of Tunisians about the hard times they face. Much earlier, countries like Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, Mozambique, and Ivory Coast suffered bouts of war and unrest of varying length and degree. Now they are mostly stable countries with elected or acceptable governments.

Good progress
Liberia had its first peaceful transfer of power from one democratically elected president to another in January 2018. Sierra Leoneans go to the polls on 7 March to elect a new president, as incumbent leader Ernest Bai Koroma completes his maximum two terms in office. Angola has a new head of state, Joao Lourenco, after a four-decade rule by Jose Eduardo dos Santos. Mr Lourenco has proved to be his own man less than a year into his rule. He removed erstwhile powerful scions of the dos Santos family from influential positions at the state oil company and sovereign wealth fund. Initial fears that an assertive Lourenco would meet with resistance from entrenched beneficiaries of the dos Santos era have proved to be misplaced. The response to the ongoing reforms in Angola have been positive within and outside the country. In Ivory Coast, another transition looms as President Alassane Ouattara concludes his final term in office. Last time there was a transition, it ended in civil war; as former president, Laurent Ggagbo, refused to accept his election defeat. The costs of that civil war remain. Rebels loyal to Mr Ouattara that were inducted into the military have been incorrigibly mutinous, for instance.

Peacekeeping, justice and democracy
Clearly, some post-crisis transitions have been better than others. Two stand out, though: Sierra Leone and Liberia. There was a time when the stability that currently prevails in these two countries was thought unthinkable. So how and why did they succeed? Sustained international support, a diminished male population from past civil wars and health epidemics, and memories of the negative consequences of conflict are some of the reasons why. Interventions by the international community in Liberia and Sierra Leone endured due to circumstances; albeit unfortunately so. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) lasted for six years; from 1999 to 2006. That for Liberia, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), is scheduled to withdraw by end-March this year; about fifteen years after it was established in September 2003. The UN missions were presaged by West African peacekeeping efforts. In 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to restore peace in then war-ravaged Liberia. Seven years after, ECOMOG was similarly deployed to Sierra Leone to quell another civil war. These international efforts, which were not devoid of controversy, contributed a great deal to the relatively successful democratic dispensations in both countries thus far. Removing former Liberian president, Charles Taylor – a key antagonist in both wars – from the scene has certainly been beneficial; albeit more relevant for the Liberian case than that for Sierra Leone. A substantially reduced male population on the back of these murderous civil wars meant either democracy or autocracy prevailed depending on the post-conflict dynamics. When the key players in the civil wars were prosecuted, the reduced testosterone count allowed democracy to thrive. When the “victors” of these wars were left to their own devices, autocracy prevailed; like in Rwanda and Angola.

Salone decides
And in Liberia and Sierra Leone, just when the peace seemed to have endured irrevocably, disaster struck again. The ebola epidemic between December 2013 and January 2016 took more than eleven thousand lives; mostly in the two countries but also in Guinea and a few in Nigeria, Mali and Senegal. Despite these troubles, Liberia conducted a successful poll in late 2017 and made its first civilian-to-civilian transition in early 2018. Sierra Leone, which would be conducting its first post-Ebola presidential election in early March, may prove similarly successful; largely a 3-way race between Julius Maada Bio of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), former UN under-secretary-general Kandeh Kolleh Yumkella of the National Grand Coalition and foreign minister Samura Kamara of the ruling All People’s Congress (APC) party candidate. Despite the not too stellar record of outgoing President Koroma, Mr Kamara, who has the overt backing of the main foreign benefactor of the state (China), is still expected to win; albeit likely by a slim margin. Mr Yumkella is one to watch, though. (I wrote a piece on the Sierra Leone polls for the March 2018 edition of African Business magazine; available at newsstands.)

Also published in my BusinessDay Nigeria newspaper column (Tuesdays). See link viz.

macroafricaintel | The Triumph of Nene

By Rafiq Raji, PhD
Twitter: @DrRafiqRaji

First impressions matter. I first happened on Nhlanhla Nene, South Africa’s second-time finance minister, some years ago now, at a Chatham House event in London. Former minister in the presidency, Jeff Radebe, was also present, as I recall. Mr Nene and selected ministers were there to take questions from economists, analysts and journalists on the state of their country’s affairs. Africans, often nostalgic about home, who are typical attendees of these Africa-focused events, were also in the audience. I am not sure now what question I asked Mr Nene. But I am almost certain it was a difficult one. As in my own case, my team members would be expecting the notes of the event, I was at the ready with my pen waiting for Mr Nene’s reply – there are usually a couple of questions taken at a time. Imagine my surprise when before answering mine, Mr Nene acknowledged me by name. We had never met before. Naturally, I was pleased. (It is a familiar trick by politicians, I know.) But since I was not the primary analyst for South Africa at my bank, he did not have to put in the effort. I would find out in due course that this was in line with his humble nature.

Smart choices
So yes, I was distraught by his unceremonious dismissal about a year later by the president of South Africa at the time, Jacob Zuma. It did not take long before the reasons why he was excused from the cabinet came to light. Unsurprisingly, Mr Nene got caught in the crosshairs of his erstwhile principal because he would not allow him have his way with the treasury. With the benefit of hindsight, it is now well-known the enormity of the forces he had to contend with. It is not unlikely Mr Zuma particularly took umbrage that someone who should expectedly be culturally inclined to his whims would be so bold. Momentarily, Mr Zuma appointed a replacement so evocative of his disdain for excellence, competence, and integrity that even he, whose unique resilience is without question, could not handle the backlash. Mr Desmond van Rooyen lasted just days as finance minister. His replacement was a former finance minister: Pravin Gordhan. Reports suggest Mr Nene was approached to take his job back but declined. He did himself a great service. Mr Gordan suffered grief upon grief working for Mr Zuma. In the end, the wily former president won what is certainly now a pyrrhic victory. Now, Mr Gordhan has been reappointed minister by President Cyril Ramaphosa; albeit to the probably now equally relevant public enterprises ministry. The drama between Mr Zuma and Mr Gordhan was a source of many columns, as I recall. Two prominent victims of Mr Zuma’s unusual ways, both former finance ministers under him, have made such an extraordinary comeback in relatively little time, that they can be nothing short of inspirational. They are humble, sound and well-respected by market participants. President Cyril Ramaphosa is smart to appoint them to his cabinet.

Same colour
The task before the new finance minister is huge. He inherits a budget that was presented about a week before his appointment. It is not the way he would have wanted to start. Not that he likely cares very much for credit. But a finance minister makes a mark by first setting out an agenda via the budget statement. No matter. He would get a chance later in the year, when hopefully, he would be in good stead and health to present the medium term bugdet policy statement. Even so, the 2018 budget is a good one; a remarkable turnaround by former finance minister Malusi Gigaba – whose “survival” and reassignment to the home affairs ministry is also instructive but not as inspiring – from what was a sloppy mid-term budget in October. In that less than remarkable proposition, Mr Gigaba was honest to a fault about the state of the country’s finances but not as creative or bold with the solutions to fix the problem. In February, he redeemed himself by making firm fiscal proposals that should plug the gaping 50 billion rand hole in the fiscus. Yes, an increase in the value-added tax is not exactly equitable. After all, the huge fiscal gap could be traced to the profligacy of the Zuma administration. What did emerge, though, was how who is president, matters; for some cadres of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party, at least. Mr Gigaba was impressive under a better sheriff. This is one of the reasons why Mr Nene is a truly remarkable person: he will do the right thing no matter who the president is.

macroafricaintel | Ethiopia: Change must be genuine and quick

By Rafiq Raji, PhD
Twitter: @DrRafiqRaji

This Saturday past, as I was reflecting on the situation in Ethiopia, I checked my archive of tweets on the matter; as I must. Imagine my displeasure when I discovered those of outgoing prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn were suddenly unavailable. Being quite familiar with how technology can fail you at the most crucial times, I quickly took a screenshot of the only two that “survived”; even though the source pages had been deleted. Thankfully, they were the two crucial ones that underpinned my ruminations. The first one was the announcement by Mr Hailemariam that he had been nominated for this year’s Nobel Peace Prize. The second was his revelation about “…a longstanding disagreement with some in the [Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)] leadership about their strong desire for the secession of the Tigray Region and to break up the rest of Ethiopia in the…”. (If my recollection is correct, Mr Hailemariam seemed quite determined to prevent this from happening, ending his tweet thus: “…I know what to do.”) As I already thought this openness of his to be quite unusual, it was not totally surprising to me that this and other revealing tweets would be subsequently deleted, though.

No more secrets
The ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) party thrived hitherto in part because of its secretive culture. Africa economists and analysts that cover Ethiopia have some of the hardest jobs in research precisely because of this. In meetings, officials are usually friendly but taciturn. Simply put: Mr Hailemariam broke the code. But then he has been breaking a lot of establishment rules lately. This context is important. Not too long after the prime minister announced his resignation, Ethiopian authorities declared a 6-month state of emergency. The last one, which lasted for 10 months, was only lifted in early August 2017. And even as it was palpable that Mr Hailemariam’s surprise resignation was aimed at allowing for a more representative leadership to appease the aggrieved majority Oromo and Amhara population, there were no recent uncontrollable incidents to warrant another emergency action so soon after the last one. Many sense foul play. This intuition would be validated when the Americans issued a strongly worded statement against the emergency action. The immediate reckoning was that perhaps the Tigray-dominated security forces had decided to take matters into their own hands; validated subsequently by Mr Hailemariam’s tweet about the secession desires – or perhaps, just posturing – of the Tigray elite.

An analysis of news in the public domain confirms the following: One, Mr Hailemariam and a few others within the EPRDF seem genuinely interested in mending fences with aggrieved ethnic groups in the country. Two, not all EPRDF members, especially those from the TPLF, are willing to do so self-destructively; albeit they recognise the self-preservation imperative of appeasing the majority Oromos and Amharas. Three, to avoid a likely harsh backlash by the politically ascendant Oromos and Amaharas when they eventually secure power, the Tigrays are considering a pre-emptive secession move. Four, the state of emergency that was declared likely did not emanate from the prime minister’s office. It is important to bear in mind the tremendous amount of leadership shown by Mr Hailemariam thus far [See earlier columns: “Time for Hailemariam to lead” (11 October 2016) and “Hailemariam must do more to build trust” (23 Jan 2018)]. Giving up power voluntarily is an anomaly on the African continent. One so inclined was not likely to then do such an about-face by resorting to the very forceful measures that proved ineffective. So, tremendous international pressure must be put on the security establishment of the still largely donor-dependent country to ensure that not only are the reform measures already put in place by Mr Hailemariam succeed but that his successor, who is expected to be chosen in a week or so, is able to sustain and build on them.

Antsy neighbours
Much more must be done than just a cosmetic change at the top, though. The security forces and public service must also be reflective of the country’s diversity; and proportionately so. Currently, they are not. Besides, Ethiopia can ill afford a crisis at this time. Tensions with neighbouring Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) are building up. Now two-thirds complete, the clout the GERD gives an already quite powerful Ethiopia – being as it is an upstream country of the River Nile – over downstream countries like Egypt and Sudan, would become almost larger than life when it is finished. The Egyptians are understandably quite nervous. Sudan is not, however: longsuffering from floods whenever the River Nile overflows its banks, Sudanese tend to be grateful for any event or measure that controls the river’s flow; especially as they would also be availed of cheap electricity when the dam is completed. Understandably, fears that Egypt might take unilateral military action against the GERD remain. Doing so while the Ethiopian leadership grapples with a political crisis might be considered sweet revenge in some quarters: Egyptian authorities allege their Ethiopian counterparts took advantage of the “Arab Spring” protests and consequent political crisis to unilaterally start construction of the dam. How likely is it that Egypt would bomb the GERD, though? Judging from the rhetoric of its officials, not very much. But it is definitely not out of the realm of possibilities. Clearly, Ethiopia needs to get its act together.

Also published in my BusinessDay Nigeria newspaper column (Tuesdays). See link viz.

macroafricaintel | The State of Our Nation

By Rafiq Raji
Twitter: @DrRafiqRaji

Four years after those very dark days we cannot soon forget, our country, Nigeria, is yet again drifting towards the abyss. Then, fellow citizens woke up almost each day to news of one bombing or the other. I was still residing in London when the now well-known “Chibok Girls” were kidnapped. The outrage over there was not immediate. I would probably not be easily forgotten at my former workplace because at some point I simply could not hide my angst at the initial indifference. Oh you bet; someone quickly issued a statement and so on. The rest is history. Considering how the government of the day at the time bungled the handling of the sad event and how years after, some of the Chibok girls remain in captivity, it is unfathomable how the current supposedly more competent government cannot even account for how many girls were kidnapped in another girls-only school in another state in northeastern Nigeria. To add insult to injury, initial news that some of the now so-called “Dapchi Girls” had been rescued turned out to be false. The administration has asked for time. Well, so did the previous one.

Be quick to act, Mr President
Lest we forget, there remains the vexing issue of the marauding Fulani herdsmen who continue to maim and kill with impunity. True, prominent Fulani leaders, like Emir Muhammadu Sanusi II of Kano, have condemned the attacks and have called for the prosecution of the culprits. And indeed, the president, Muhammadu Buhari, has similarly tasked the security agencies to deal squarely with the matter; albeit not as early and quickly as he should have. Besides, even the security measures he has directed have not been without some controversy: Benue youths recently took exception to the characterization of the so-called “Operation Rat Race” as a “training exercise” by the chief of army staff, Tukur Buratai. Is it that the incidents in Benue are not serious enough to warrant a proper military operation? Is it strategy? To the second question, one might wonder why a similar strategy was not deployed to similar troubles in the southeastern and Niger Delta regions of the country. We have to assume Mr Buratai did not mean to cause offense. But inevitably, as is usually the case with such miscommunication, all sorts of conspiracy theories have begun to emerge. Why would not the president visit Benue State? Considering Mr Buhari has visited Nassarawa, Adamawa, and Katsina States since the most recent major killings in that self-acclaimed food basket of the nation, this is more than a tad troubling. (It is probably irrelevant now whether he visits Benue or not: the Yobe incident is now uppermost on everyone’s mind and would likely take all the attention.) Of course, a Buharist might be quick to point out that his presence is not as necessary as the security measures he has already taken. Another potential rationalization might be that the president should not and cannot visit every place there happens to be a violent incident. Well, on the second point, one might argue he could not now do so because there are now too many of them: wanton killings have been occuring elsewhere; in the northwestern state of Zamfara, for instance.

Violence as politics
It is highly unlikely these violent incidents are random. The recent surge is definitely related to the already heightened political activities ahead of the 2019 elections. When similar violent incidents happened during the administration of former president, Goodluck Jonathan, it was easy to allege that the north was perhaps trying to force the hand of the southerner in power at the time. That simplistic characterization cannot be made this time around. And while it is tempting to suggest that perhaps elements from rival political parties might be fuelling the current violence, it would be lazy thinking to do so. In trying to analyse the political dynamics around a situation, a clearer perspective is easily attained if you simply dimension the issues and events by who benefits and who loses. The beneficiary of the insecurity in the land during the Jonathan administration was Mr Buhari; whose military credentials was a source of comfort for those who voted him to fix the problem. Unsurprisingly, it is not unlikely that those aiming to unseat Mr Buhari would have more than a keen interest in seeing that the one thing he is supposedly good at is the one thing he fails at. After all, it worked before. So, I will throw the question: do you think this recent violence would ebb if Mr Buhari decides not to run for a second term? I will leave the answer to you. I guess the other curious reckoning you might have is who in the opposition is perhaps engineering or fuelling these negative incidents; if at all. We, Yorubas, have a saying for such conundrums: the insect eating away at spinach resides in it.